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RADICAL TECHNOLOGY-FORCING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Thomas 0. McGarity*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the opening scene of Putney Swope, an off-beat, low-budget movie
of the late 1960s, the chairman of the board of a large advertising agency,
in the midst of delivering some bad financial news to the board of direc-
tors, suffered a fatal heart attack and fell face down on the large confer-
ence table. With the chairman spread out on the table, the board
proceeded immediately to the next order of business--electing a new
chairman. The bylaws, however, prevented any board members from
voting for themselves. Nearly all of the board members voted for the
token African-American director, a musician named Putney Swope, be-
cause each concluded that none of the other directors would vote for
him. Having been duly elected, Swope moved to the head of the table to
address the nervous group of aging white gentlemen. Swope then
launched into his speech: "The changes I'm going to make will be mini-
mal. I'm not going to rock the boat. Rocking the boat's a drag. What
you do is sink the boat. And there's no sense sinkin' nothin' unless you
can salvage with productive alternatives."' The scene suddenly shifted to
the same boardroom a short time later. Swope was still the chairman,
but a garish assembly of social outcasts replaced the old board and pro-
ceeded to take the company in a hazily conceived, but radically different
direction.
Although the remainder of the movie is entirely forgettable, the
opening scene left such a strong impression on me that the title is now a
verb in my lexicon. For me, to "Putney Swope" something is to replace
it with something radically different, even in the face of substantial
doubts that the replacement will work or that such a substitute even ex-
ists. An author Putney Swopes an early draft of a manuscript when he or
she throws it in the trash, rather than attempting to revise the existing
work product. The United States government has Putney Swoped the
federally sponsored projects such as the breeder reactor, the Super Sonic
* William Stamps Farish, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; B.A.,
1971, Rice University; J.D., 1974, University of Texas.
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Transport, and the superconducting supercollider, and it may one day
Putney Swope nuclear warheads. The federal government can also Put-
ney Swope private activities that pose unacceptable health and environ-
mental risks in the hope that private entrepreneurs will produce better
alternatives within reasonable time frames. This Essay will briefly ex-
amine radical technology-forcing through banning, or phasing out items
or activities a la Putney Swope. This Essay will offer a few brief exam-
ples of such radical technology-forcing in action, and it will suggest situa-
tions in which such actions may prove feasible, or may fail.
II. RADICAL TECHNOLOGY-FORCING IN CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS
American courts have generally been reluctant to engage in radical
technology-forcing in common-law nuisance actions. When Oscar
Boomer asked the New York Court of Appeals2 to shut down the Atlan-
tic Cement Company's dirty and noisy Portland cement plant that was
built adjacent to his property, the court declined, even though existing
precedent rather clearly mandated abatement.3 The court did not share
Boomer's confidence that Atlantic Cement would come up with a suita-
ble clean-up technology if the company was told in no uncertain terms
that it would have to shut the plant down in eighteen months in the
absence of a suitable solution.'
Partially in response to this judicial tentativeness, Congress enacted
the first round of environmental statute amendments in the early 1970s.
Sponsors of the Clean Air Act amendments of 19771 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 19726 spoke of the need to
"force technology" to meet the needs of a more environmentally sensitive
public. To force technology meant different things in different regulatory
contexts, however. In the clean water context, it initially meant forcing
the industrial laggards to install better-than-average technologies in five
years and top-of-the-line technologies in ten years. Although this tech-
nology-based technology-forcing brought about tremendous decreases in
industrial discharges of conventional water pollutants, it did not inspire
industries to significantly change their policies. They were able to meet
2. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (N.Y. 1970).
3. Id. at 870-71.
4. Id. at 872-73.
5. Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
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nearly all of the first-round standards and most of the second-round stan-
dards by adding existing technology to the "end-of-the-pipe." '
.The quality-based media approach to the Clean Air Act had the
potential to force the engineers to come up with new approaches to pollu-
tion control, at least in those areas that were not likely to achieve the
ambient air quality standards by the statutory deadlines. But as the
states failed to impose stringent emissions limitations in state implemen-
tation plans, and as it became increasingly apparent that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) would either extend or ignore the
statutory deadlines, the media quality-based approach quickly lost its po-
tential to force technology. In both cases the EPA was generally either
unwilling or unable to shut down individual sources or industries.
Rather, it merely nudged industries forward-in the case of the Clean
Water ActS-or encouraged the states to send a stronger message to their
heaviest polluters-in the case of the Clean Air Act.9
A. Mirex
Ironically, the EPA first successfully adopted a radical technology-
forcing approach in the pesticides regulation context, where technology-
forcing rhetoric was virtually nonexistent. When the EPA prohibited the
use of the pesticide dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT), it could
point to slightly more expensive substitutes that would kill the target
insects if DDT was no longer available. When the EPA canceled the use
of related pesticides aldrin and dieldrin, it could point inter alia to
heptachlor and chlordane as substitutes for all economically important
uses. When it came time to cancel heptachlor and chlordane, however,
the agency could not as confidently predict that cheap substitutes would
be available for all important uses, and it refrained from canceling the
pesticides for those uses. For example, the agency did not cancel the
registrations of chlordane for termite control because EPA staffers were
7. D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Stat-
utes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 811 (1977).
8. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
9. The EPA has always had the power under the Clean Air Act to promulgate a Federal
Implementation Plan (FIP) when the state fails to submit an adequate state implementation
plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). For many reasons, however, this power
has seldom been exercised. The EPA wrote very few FIPs until the courts began ordering it to
do so in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
Reilly v. Delaney, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); McCarthy v. Thomas, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 21,214 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 1987).
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not convinced that the pesticide industry could produce an acceptable
substitute for chlordane in a relatively brief period of time.10
The agency adopted a more radical approach with respect to the
pesticide mirex. After initiating and partially completing a lengthy for-
mal information-gathering hearing regarding mirex, a potent killer of the
notoriously aggressive imported fire ant, the EPA initiated settlement ne-
gotiations. Initially the primary parties involved in these negotiations
included the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an environmental
group that wanted mirex canceled; Allied Chemical Company, the sole
registrant of technical grade mirex; the United States Department of Ag-
riculture, which sprayed mirex out of B-26 bombers over hundreds of
southern counties as part of the federally sponsored fire ant eradication
program; the Southern Plant Board, composed of the agriculture com-
missioners of the states to which the eradication program's federal dol-
lars were directed; and the EPA, which maintained an official position of
strict neutrality with respect to the question of whether mirex should be
canceled. "
As the parties negotiated the prospects of mirex dimmed. An EPA
survey revealed that mirex, which caused cancer in laboratory mice, was
detected in the adipose tissue of a substantial proportion of the popula-
tion of the states in which the eradication program was in effect.12
Allied Chemical Company decided to cease production of pesticides
in the wake of a disaster in Hopewell, Virginia, in which a fly-by-night
company operating from an abandoned gas station polluted the James
River and the lower half of Chesapeake Bay with a related pesticide,
kepone, which Allied provided to the company. 3 Although Allied sold
the mirex manufacturing plant to the State of Mississippi for one dollar,
some state legislators were uncomfortable about the state's entry in the
pesticide manufacturing business. Pressure also grew on the USDA to
abandon the costly eradication program. As a result of the considerable
10. Exempting residential termite pesticide use from the chlordane cancellation was proba-
bly a mistake. Contrary to agency predictions, thousands of people were exposed to chlordane
in later years because of that remaining use. Ant Poison Under Fire, CHEMICAL WK., July 28,
1976, at 23.
11. See Bill Richards, EPA Ponders Approving a New Weapon against Fire Ant, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 1978, at A9.
12. Ant Poison Under Fire, supra note 10; Allied Fined Maximum, CHEMICAL WK., Oct.
13, 1976, at 23.
13. See Spread of Deadly Chemcial-and the Ever Widening Impact, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 6, 1976, at 43.
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leverage that these events provided to the EDF in the settlement negotia-
tions, it refused to settle for anything short of a complete ban of mirex.
14
The problem with a complete ban was the absence of any registered
substitute for killing fire ants except for chlordane, which itself was sub-
ject to cancellation proceedings. While USDA and EPA program offi-
cials fretted that with no pesticidal weapons on the horizon the fire ants
would march unimpeded across the South and Midwest, EDF and EPA
attorneys confidently predicted that if fire ants were enough of a problem
to inspire a market for fire ant killers, innovative American companies
would come up with suitable alternatives.15 Conversely, so long as the
USDA was willing to provide mirex free of charge, it would be overused
and a market for substitutes would never develop. Ultimately, the par-
ties agreed to produce and use mirex in diminishing quantities during a
two-year phase-out period.16 As predicted, four companies asked the
EPA to register substitutes for mirex well within the phase-out period.
Fifteen years later, fire ants remain a nuisance in all of the states
that were part of the fire ant eradication program, but their range has not
extended appreciably. When an infestation becomes unmanageable, a
landowner can choose from among several formulations of direct-action
insecticides or baits, and can even apply a slower acting but more effec-
tive biological ant killer. Most importantly, the natural environment of
the nine southern states is no longer exposed to an exceedingly persistent,
potentially carcinogenic organochlorine pesticide.
B. Lead Phase Down
Another early, yet less successful EPA attempt at radical technol-
ogy-forcing was the lengthy effort to eliminate tetraethyl lead from gaso-
line. For decades prior to the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments, petroleum refiners used tetraethyl lead as a fuel additive in
order to increase the octane rating of gasoline, and to reduce engine
"knocking." After serving this useful purpose, the lead would exit the
tailpipe and remain airborne for some time, where residents of urban
neighborhoods could breathe it. Airborne lead would also fall to the
ground, where children could ingest it.17 In both cases, airborne lead
14. See generally Is EPA Stifling Development of New Pesticides?, CHEMICAL WK., Oct. 29,
1975, at 25.
15. Ward Sinclair, EPA Pressed to Approve New Fire Ant Pesticide, WASH. POST, Feb. 20,
1982, at A6.
16. End of Line for Mirex, CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 3, 1976, at 18.
17. Bloodborne lead can cause various maladies, including anemia, reproductive defects,
and cognitive impairment.
April 1994]
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increased the already high level of lead in the blood of urban residents.'"
When the EPA first began devoting attention to the health effects of air-
borne lead in the early 1970s, approximately ninety percent of all of the
gasoline burned in the United States contained lead additives.' 9
The EPA's first attempt to regulate lead in gasoline resulted from
the fact that tetraethyl lead in gasoline tends to poison catalytic convert-
ers. The 1970 amendments required automobiles to reduce emissions of
hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide to certain speci-
fied levels by a certain date, and the EPA soon became convinced that
the only technology capable of meeting the statutory requirements was
the catalytic converter. Since tetraethyl lead in gasoline would reduce
the effectiveness of such converters, the EPA promulgated a rule in 1973
requiring service stations to offer at least one grade of unleaded gasoline,
which the EPA defined as "gasoline with no more than 0.05 grams of
lead per gallon of gasoline (gpg)."2 o The petroleum industry bitterly con-
tested this regulation, arguing that it would be impossible to clean out
existing lead-contaminated tanks and fuel lines by the 1975 deadline.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, upheld the regula-
tions in all important areas, and after an EPA-granted delay, service sta-
tions began to offer unleaded gasoline by the late 1970s.2 '
The EPA was also moving on several other fronts. On February 23,
1972 the EPA proposed regulations designed to reduce the lead content
in all gasoline in accordance with a prescribed phase-down schedule on
the ground that leaded gasoline endangered the public health.22 To a
greater extent than the earlier regulations, these health-based regulations
depended upon a "leap of faith" that the refining industry would be able
to come up with suitable alternatives for enhancing octane and reducing
knocking. The rule required refiners to reduce the lead content of gaso-
line to 1.7 grams per gallon by January 1, 1975, and to 0.5 grams per
gallon by January 1, 1979.23 The regulations exempted "small refin-
ers"-as defined in the regulations-from the 1975 deadline, but not
from the 1979 deadline.24 The regulation allowed a refiner to "pool" the
leaded gasoline that it produced with any unleaded gasoline, so that it
could raise the lead content of its leaded gas so long as it produced a
18. 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,736 (1973).
19. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
20. 40 C.F.R. § 80.2(g) (1992).
21. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22. 37 Fed. Reg. 3882 (1972) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80) (proposed Feb. 23, 1972).
23. 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734 (1973).
24. Id. at 33,740.
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correspondingly larger amount of unleaded gas.2 5 The D.C. Circuit, in
an en banc opinion that has become a classic in administrative law, up-
held the rule against industry arguments that the EPA had not drawn a
sufficient connection between lead in gasoline and health effects in
human beings.26 The court also upheld the EPA's determination that
alternative fuels and fuel additives would not endanger the public health
to the same or to a greater degree than lead additives.27
Environmental groups were not satisfied with the EPA's exclusive
reliance on the phase-down approach, and they persuaded the Second
Circuit in 1976 to order the EPA to list lead as a "criteria pollutant" for
which it must promulgate national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS).28 Two years later, the EPA promulgated final regulations es-
tablishing a primary NAAQS for lead of 1.5 micrograms per cubic
meter.29 Two years after that, on June 27, 1980, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the standard,30 and the states began writing state implementation plans
to ensure that lead emissions from all sources-including stationary
sources such as lead smelters-would not exceed the NAAQS three years
after approval of the plans.3"
Had the EPA exclusively relied on the ambient air quality standard
approach, the states would have been obligated to regulate stationary and
mobile sources of lead so as to achieve the NAAQS by the statutory
deadline. Since no individual state could have required oil companies to
reduce the lead content of gasoline, the states would probably have fo-
cused their attention on stationary sources and traffic controls of the sort
that have proven notoriously unsuccessful for carbon monoxide and pho-
tochemical oxidants. As it was, the states could depend upon the na-
tional lead phase down to reduce lead emissions from mobile sources,
and they simply factored the national lead phase-down projections into
their own attainment demonstrations.
The energy crisis of the mid-1970s caused the EPA to extend the
phase-down schedule for reaching the 0.5 gpg level from 1979 to October
1, 1982.32 The exemptions for small refiners also remained in effect.33
25. Id. at 33,739.
26. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 111-12.
27. Id.
28. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,052 (1980).
30. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1042
(1980).
31. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 77,052 (1980).
32. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (1980).
33. 47 Fed. Reg. 7814 (1982).
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During the 1979-1982 extension period, a small subindustry of "blend-
ers" arose to take advantage of the small refiner exemptions. These
blenders would purchase inexpensive, low-octane gas from foreign mar-
kets and blend in just enough high-octane leaded gas to stay within the
small-refiner exemption. Although the major refineries retooled their
plants to produce unleaded gasoline almost exclusively by the early
1980s, the small refiners-including the newly created blenders-and the
manufacturers of tetraethyl lead were not anxious to see leaded gasoline
phased out. After the 1981 inauguration they responded to an invitation
from Vice President Bush to suggest rules that should be revisited. At
the urging of the Vice President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, the
EPA agreed to consider repealing the lead phase-down rule, and it there-
fore published a notice of proposed rule making setting out several op-
tions that it was considering, including total rescission of the rule. 4 The
notice proposed to suspend indefinitely the October 1, 1982 standard for
small refiners, and solicited comments on the proper definition of "small
refiner" in light of the advent of the blending subindustry.35 Finally, the
Agency proposed to tighten slightly the standard for large refiners to 1.1
grams per leaded gallon and to eliminate pooling. 6 Under the proposal,
small refiners would have to comply with a 2.5-gram-per-leaded-gallon
standard.37
The EPA's announcement of its willingness to consider repealing
the rule precipitated a loud and angry outcry from environmental groups
and advocates of urban children, including the NAACP. At the same
time the EPA received pressure from small refiners to extend their ex-
emptions for several more years. In addition to pressing their economic
concerns, the small refiners-as had the large refiners in the earlier rule
making-argued that the EPA had not established any connection be-
tween leaded gasoline and adverse human health effects. While the EPA
was considering these outside comments, the Centers for Disease Control
published the results of its comprehensive Second National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES II) study on blood-lead levels
in urban residents.3 8 The study showed a very clear correlation between
the reduction in use of leaded gasoline--due to the EPA's prior rules-
and a decline in blood lead levels. 39 Although the study did not conclude
34. 47 Fed. Reg. 7812 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
35. Id.
36. 47 Fed. Reg. 38,078, 38,079 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
37. Id.
38. See generally 47 Fed. Reg. 38,070 (1982).
39. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 527-28 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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that reductions in leaded gasoline use reduced the incidence of any par-
ticular illness, it did dramatically demonstrate the effectiveness of the
earlier standard. Consequently, the EPA published a final rule that es-
tablished a uniform standard of 1.1 grams per leaded gallon for large and
small refiners alike." Small refiners persuaded the D.C. Circuit, how-
ever, that the EPA had not adequately put them on notice of this possible
outcome, and the court therefore remanded the standard on January 26,
1983 for reconsideration of several aspects related to small refiners.4
The 1.1-grams-per-leaded-gallon benchmark was roughly equivalent
to the 0.5-grams-per-gallon standard that the Agency had originally
promulgated. The EPA soon discovered, however, that rampant fuel
switching was occurring in some parts of the country. The price differen-
tial between leaded and unleaded gasoline encouraged some drivers to
burn leaded fuel; other drivers believed that unleaded gasoline reduced
engine performance to unacceptable levels.42 As a result, not only were
newer automobiles spewing lead into the environment, but their poisoned
catalysts were also allowing more carbon monoxide and photochemical
oxidants into the air. In addition, the EPA discovered that a lot more
leaded gas was being marketed than was indicated by its earlier projec-
tions, which were based upon overly optimistic assumptions about fleet
turnover. In other words, the limited phase-out approach had failed. Fi-
nally, more recent scientific studies demonstrated negative health effects
due to exposure to lead at even lower blood levels than the earlier studies
had shown.43
The EPA concluded from this information that "the rapid reduction
and eventual end to the use of lead in gasoline is an appropriate objec-
tive."'  Therefore, on August 2, 1984 the EPA proposed to lower the
standard once again to 0.1 grams per leaded gallon, effective January 1,
1986.4' The EPA determined that a small amount of lead would still be
needed in gasoline burned by older vehicles to provide lubrication. Spec-
ulating that in the long run leaded gas would no longer be needed as
40. 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1982).
41. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 542.
42. 49 Fed. Reg. 31,032 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80) (proposed Aug. 2, 1984).
Cars equipped with catalytic converters were designed to use only unleaded fuel; therefore, the
neck of their gasoline tanks was smaller in diameter than older cars. Fuel nozzles on unleaded
gas pumps were correspondingly smaller than nozzles on leaded gas pumps. According to the
EPA, fuel switching could be accomplished by removing or damaging the nozzle restrictor at
the neck of the gas tank, by using an improper size fuel nozzle, or by funnelling leaded gasoline
into the gas tank. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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substitute lubricants became available and as older automobiles were re-
tired from the fleet, the EPA suggested a complete ban on leaded gaso-
line by 1995.46 On March 7, 1985 the EPA promulgated a final rule
adopting the 0.1 standard effective January 1, 1986 and reopening the
comment period for the proposed total ban by 1995.47
Although the Agency has yet to promulgate a final ban on lead in
gasoline, the major refiners have converted completely to unleaded gaso-
line. It is still possible to find a service station that sells leaded gasoline,
but they are increasingly rare. As a practical matter, a complete ban has
been achieved. Alternatives to leaded gasoline are easily available at af-
fordable prices, and further reductions in blood levels of urban children
continue to bear out the wisdom of the phase down. The energy crisis
and the Vice President's Task Force extended the phase-down period
much longer than necessary, but the effort overall must count as an envi-
ronmental success story.
C. Asbestos
Asbestos has been widely used for decades as an insulator in resi-
dences and by industry, and as a liner for automobile brakes. Industrial
hygienists have known for many years that asbestos causes a debilitating
disease called "asbestosis" in workers who are exposed to high concen-
trations of airborne asbestos fibers in the workplace.48 More recently,
scientists have discovered that asbestos fibers cause a rare form of cancer
called "mesothelioma" in human beings.49 Since most scientists agree
that no level of exposure is completely safe, airborne asbestos is of con-
cern to the general public as well as workers.
Asbestos posed such a serious threat to workers that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) very first occupa-
tional health standard, promulgated in June 1972, dealt with asbestos.5 0
Asbestos was one of the first four substances for which the EPA promul-
gated national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants
(NESHAPs) under section 112 of the Clean Air Act on March 31,
1971.51 The common-law courts were also very active in compensating
46. Id.
47. 50 Fed. Reg. 9386 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 763 (1986).
49. Id.
50. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. See 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1992).
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victims of exposure to airborne asbestos-usually workers-after the la-
tent diseases manifested themselves. 2
As more information on the toxic effects of asbestos became avail-
able, OSHA determined that the 1972 standard was not sufficiently pro-
tective. Therefore, in 1975 it proposed an amended standard that called
for a reduction in the allowable exposure to airborne asbestos from
twelve fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc) to 0.5 f/cc.5 3 Nothing came of
this proposal until almost ten years later when, in April 1984, OSHA
issued a new notice of proposed rulemaking that suggests the standard be
lowered to at least 0.5 f/cc and perhaps even to 0.2 f/cc. 4 After lengthy
hearings, OSHA promulgated a final rule in July 1986 setting the allowa-
ble exposure level at 0.2 f/cc.55 OSHA settled upon that level because it
was the lowest level that employees could feasibly achieve in most work-
places. OSHA concluded that even at that significantly lower level of
exposure, employees still faced a "significant risk" of contracting cancer.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the 0.2 f/cc standard, but remanded asbestos
cases for consideration of why it was not feasible in some industrial cate-
gories to achieve even lower exposure levels.
5 6
At the same time that OSHA was deciding whether to lower its
standard for asbestos, the EPA was considering an even more radical
proposal to ban asbestos in a phase-down process similar to the one used
for tetraethyl lead. It was reasonably clear that OSHA only had the
power to reduce the workplace exposures to levels that an employer
could feasibly achieve with existing pollution reduction technologies; it
could not simply eliminate asbestos from the workplace. The EPA, on
the other hand, believed that it had the authority under section 6 of
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)5 7 to get to the root of the problem
by banning asbestos in the workplace and elsewhere. Some staffers
within the EPA reasoned that since substitutes existed-or would easily
become available for all significant uses of asbestos-a complete ban
would protect those exposed to airborne asbestos.
In 1979 the EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing announcing that it was considering whether to exercise its section 6
52. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
53. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,652 (1975) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Oct. 9,
1975).
54. 49 Fed. Reg. 14,116 (1984) (proposed Apr. 10, 1984).
55. 51 Fed. Reg. 22,612 (1986) (proposed June 20, 1986).
56. Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1279-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988).
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authority to regulate asbestos.5" As the EPA came closer to concluding
that asbestos should be banned, officials from the Canadian government
urged the regulatory review office in the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to stop the effort in its tracks.5 9 In July 1984 the OMB
objected to the EPA's tentative conclusion that it should ban about half
of all asbestos-containing products." Yielding to further pressure from
the OMB, the EPA abandoned the initiative entirely and referred the
issue to OSHA and to the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 61 This
action precipitated a rare public protest by EPA career employees and
harsh criticism from several congresspersons. The EPA then reversed its
position once again and issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on Janu-
ary 29, 1986 in which it concluded that asbestos posed an "unreasonable
risk to human health." The notice proposed four alternative regulatory
approaches for reducing that risk.62 All but one of the proposed options
would have resulted in a total ban of asbestos within ten years. On July
12, 1989 the EPA issued a final rule in which it decided to eliminate most
commercial uses of asbestos over a seven-year period.63
Several manufacturers of asbestos-containing products challenged
the rule in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an opinion that se-
verely restricted the radical technology-forcing approach under the
TSCA, the court set the rule aside.' From the mandate in section six of
the TSCA that the EPA choose the "least burdensome" of the regulatory
alternatives listed in that section, the court concluded that the statute
58. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989).
59. 5 INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION 6-7 (1986). The Canadian government was con-
cerned about the impact of an asbestos ban on its asbestos mining industry.
60. 5 INSIDE EPA 1 (1984).
61. EPA to Shift Responsibility to OSHA, CPSC; Plans to Refer Other Chemical Regula-
tions, 13 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 73 (July 19, 1985).
62. 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763) (proposed Jan. 29,
1986). The four alternatives included (1) a mixed ban and phase out of asbestos over ten years;
(2) a two-stage ban of asbestos, depending upon product usage; (3) a three-stage ban on all
asbestos products leading to a total ban in ten years; and (4) labeling of all products containing
asbestos. Id.
63. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763) (proposed July 12,
1989). According to the court of appeals the phase out would occur as follows:
(1) Stage 1: August 27, 1990: ban on asbestos-containing floor materials, clothing,
roofing felt, corrugated and flat sheet materials, pipeline wrap, and new asbestos uses;
(2) Stage 2: August 25, 1993: ban on asbestos-containing "friction products" and
certain automotive products or uses;
(3) Stage 3: August 26, 1996: ban on other asbestos-containing automotive products
or uses, asbestos-containing building materials including non-roof and roof coatings,
and asbestos cement shingles.
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1208 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991).
64. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1201.
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established a "least-to-most-burdensome hierarchy" of regulatory
options.
In order to impose a regulation at the top of the hierarchy-a
total ban of asbestos-the EPA must show not only that its
proposed action reduces the risk of the product to an adequate
level, but also that the actions Congress identified as less bur-
densome also would not do the job. The failure of the EPA to
do this constitutes a failure to meet its burden of showing that
its actions not only reduce the risk but do so in the Congressio-
nally-mandated least burdensome fashion.65
Before the EPA may ban a chemical under the TSCA, it must first ana-
lyze the costs and benefits of all the alternatives.
Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course
for the EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option,
beginning with the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits
of regulation under each option. The EPA cannot simply skip
several rungs, as it did in this case, for in doing so, it may skip a
less burdensome alternative mandated by TSCA.66
This very burdensome analytical requirement will no doubt discourage
the EPA from attempting to phase out chemicals under the TSCA in the
future.
III. CONCLUSION
Although radical technology-forcing is not a solution to all environ-
mental pollution problems, in some contexts it is superior to the two pri-
mary alternative approaches-the media quality-based approach and the
technology-based approach.
The media quality-based approach requires the regulatory entity to
make extremely difficult judgments about the effects of a toxic substance
on affected organisms, the degree to which discharges or emissions of the
substance must be reduced to bring those effects to within acceptable
levels, how any such reductions should be apportioned among the ex-
isting-and perhaps future-sources of the substance, and the time limits
within which such reductions must be accomplished. The media quality-
based approach is especially difficult to implement because pollution con-
trol technologies are very expensive and most of the sources of the pollu-
tant have been in existence for many years. In this context agencies and
legislatures are inclined either to "grandfather" existing sources, thereby
65. Id. at 1217 (footnote omitted).
66. Id.
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shifting the burden of pollution reduction to new sources, or to extend
the deadlines for attaining the media quality-based standards."
The technology-based approach requires the regulatory entity to di-
vide industries into categories and subcategories, to identify the best pol-
lution control technologies for those categories and subcategories, and to
establish limitations based on the feasibility of implementing the model
technologies, the cost of compliance, and other relevant considerations.
Since cost is always a constraining criterion, there is no guarantee that
the technology-based approach will achieve the degree of pollution re-
duction necessary to protect the exposed organisms. For example,
OSHA's feasibility-limited approach to standard setting resulted in an
asbestos standard that was feasible to implement, but still left workers
subject to a significant risk of contracting mesothelioma.
The primary advantage of radical technology-forcing is its ease of
implementation. The media quality inquiry is simply whether the risks
at existing levels of exposure are acceptable. If not, then a ban may be
appropriate. The economic and technological feasibility inquiry extends
only to whether feasible substitutes are likely to be available at the time
that the ban or phase out takes effect. Although an agency adopting that
approach will have to evaluate the risks posed by the relevant substance
or activity and the availability of substitutes, it will not necessarily have
to engage in a finely tuned analysis of what risks are associated with par-
ticular ambient concentrations-as it must under the media quality ap-
proach. Nor will it be required to estimate pollution reduction loads and
allocate them among existing sources. Radical technology-forcing can,
of course, be adapted to incorporate a more sophisticated analysis of the
risks and benefits posed by the subject substance or activity. A pesticide
cancellation, for example, involves a balancing of the pesticide's risks
against its benefits. To the extent that the agency is obligated to engage
67. Many observers have suggested that these difficulties can be reduced by implementing
a system of marketable permits or effluent charges that would force emitters of the pollutant to
pay to pollute. This plan would provide an incentive to install pollution reduction technolo-
gies, rather than pay the fee or purchase the permit. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, The Econo-
mist's Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 123 Scl. 498 (1971); Richard B. Stewart,
Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
Those techniques, however, are largely applicable only to the problem of divvying up the pol-
lution reduction load among the sources of the pollutant. The regulatory entity must still
determine the acceptable level of media quality and estimate the pollution reduction load.
Indeed, it is not even clear that charges or marketable permits would solve the problem of
existing polluters with political clout. In theory, any source that cannot afford to purchase the
permits or pay the charge will have to go out of business. It may be quixotic, however, to
believe that politically potent, but cash poor businesses will quietly close their doors once the
charge or permit scheme is implemented.
[Vol. 27:943
RADICAL TECHNOLOGY-FORCING
in a finely tuned cost-benefit analysis, however, the advantage of ease of
implementation is reduced.
A second significant advantage of radical technology-forcing is its
potential to induce genuine technological innovation. The technology-
based approach can bring the laggards up to speed, but it rarely brings
about actual technological change. 8 The media quality approach is ca-
pable of forcing technology indirectly into areas in which it will be diffi-
cult to meet the standards by the relevant deadlines. If sources in such
areas are confident that they will not be grandfathered and that the dead-
lines will not be extended, then they may be induced to invest in innova-
tive controls. The record in that regard, however, is not encouraging.
For example, Congress has regularly extended the deadlines for attaining
the national ambient air quality standards, and some states have legisla-
tion forbidding the state environmental agency from imposing require-
ments on existing sources that are not technologically and economically
feasible.69
Radical technology-forcing enables the agency to "take a leap of
faith" in cases in which substitutes are not presently available. As in the
case of mirex, the agency is able to place its faith in the ingenuity of
American industry to develop substitutes for the banned substance or
activity by the specified deadlines. If, however, no substitutes appear on
the immediate horizon, then the agency will be able to adopt a phase-out
approach. A phase-out period significantly reduces the economic impact
of banning a substance or activity; it provides time for substitutes to be
developed, and it allows companies to shift production away from the
banned product. The agency must be aware, however, that scientific and
political circumstances may change in a manner requiring an extension
of the phase-out period. It is always easier to extend a phase-out period
than it is to shorten one. The emergence of the blender industry in the
midst of the EPA's lead phase-down proceedings is a good example of
what can happen when the agency is too eager to extend deadlines.7"
However, radical technology-forcing is not appropriate in all envi-
ronmental contexts. It will not work when an environmental problem
has complex causes-for example, dissolved oxygen in heavily used riv-
ers-that cannot be addressed by banning a single substance or activity.
68. La Pierre, supra note 7, at 837-38.
69. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43,013 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/27 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.133 (West
1990 & Supp. 1993).
70. See supra part II.B.
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It is best adapted to situations in which a single substance or activity is
causing particular environmental problems.
The approach is also risky when the consequences of the failure to
inspire technological innovation are very high. For example, despite ef-
forts by environmentalists in the early 1970s to ban the internal combus-
tion engine, Congress and the EPA were unwilling to risk the turmoil
that would have resulted if automobile manufacturers had failed to come
up with a suitable engine for passenger vehicles. The approach is best
suited for the opposite situation in which the consequences of not taking
any action are relatively severe.
Finally, the EPA's experience with asbestos suggests that an agency
should be reluctant to rely upon radical technology-forcing when there is
a serious question about whether its statutes authorize it to adopt that
approach. Not only are American courts reluctant to Putney Swope ac-
tivities in common-law nuisance cases, they are also reluctant to allow
federal agencies to Putney Swope things without congressional blessing.
Courts will probably carefully examine the agency's legal authority to
adopt that approach, and will certainly take a "hard look" at the scien-
tific and technical basis for the agency's action.
Although the Putney Swope approach is not a universal solution to
the problem of regulating activities that pose a threat to the human envi-
ronment, it should be a more often used weapon in the regulatory arse-
nal. The Putney Swope approach is responsible for some of the clearest
environmental success stories. The agency that would adopt a radical
technology-forcing approach must have courage and imagination. It
must have the flexibility to extend the deadlines when the facts prove that
it is being overly optimistic, but it must sternly resist attempts by the
regulated industry to avoid change through artful brinkmanship. In
short, the agency must carefully seek out situations in which a major
disruption of an unacceptable status quo will lead to a better future.
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